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Abstract—We propose a systematic framework for analysing
forum datasets, which contain minimal structure, and are non-
trivial to analyse at scale, aiming to support future analysis of
underground forum communities. We use a multi-technique ap-
proach which draws on a combination of features, including post
classifications extracted using natural language processing tools,
and apply clustering and predictive techniques to this dataset,
to predict potential key actors—individuals who have a central
role in overtly criminal activities, or activities which could lead to
later offending, and hence might benefit most from interventions.
We predict 49 key actors on an underground gaming-specific
cheating and hacking forum, validated by observing only overlaps
of techniques, combined with topic analysis, to build a classifier
for key actor status. In addition, we also use these techniques to
provide further insight of key actor activity. We found one cluster
and two posting trajectories to contain a high proportion of key
actors, logistic regression found an actor’s h-index to have higher
odds for prediction than other features, and partial dependence
plots found reputation to have a significant change in prediction
between values of 100 to 1000.
Index Terms—Cybercrime, Underground Forums, Online
Gaming, Pathways, Key Actors
I. INTRODUCTION
There is increasing interest in the possible pathway from
playing online games to committing cybercrime. The UK’s
National Crime Agency (NCA) [1] undertook a small-scale
study which highlighted a potential link between online gam-
ing and entry points into cybercrime. This identified a potential
pathway beginning with the use of gaming cheats, which—
depending on the tools used—can be legal. These cheats are
available on online underground forums, which can lead to
further interaction and potentially escalation into more serious
cybercrime activity.
While there has been much research into online under-
ground forums (e.g. [2]–[9]), their relationship with online
gaming has been largely unexplored. As the identification
of these potential pathways suggest that online underground
forums may play an instrumental role in the shift from legal
to illegal activities, there has been interest from UK law
enforcement in exploring intervention activities which might
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deter gamers with an interest in these forums from becoming
involved in illegal activities. For example, the NCA has run
‘advertorials’ on three UK gaming websites as part of their
‘Cyber Choices’ campaign [10]–[12]. These were used to
inform people about the illegality of ‘booter’ services—a type
of low-level cybercrime popular on these types of forums,
which involves paying for a service to disrupt the network
connection of opponents on online games [13]. The barrier
to entry for carrying out these attacks is low, and previous
research has found that this provides some individuals involved
in online gaming with a pathway into more serious illegal
activities [14].
Datasets of posts made on underground cybercrime forums
collected by web scrapers are a valuable resource for re-
searchers interested in exploring a range of research questions
linked to cybercrime and security. However, these tend to
constitute hundreds of thousands of messages over many years,
and are therefore difficult to analyse by traditional means.
In this paper, we propose a multi-technique framework for
processing and carrying out analysis on forum data focused
around the identification of key actors and their signature
characteristics in these datasets, who are likely to benefit the
most from diversion. Key actors are defined as those who are
involved in activities that are likely to make them of interest
to law enforcement, such as overtly criminal activities (e.g.
sharing tools used for hacking), or activities which are not
necessarily illegal but may lead to later offending, such as
sharing tools and tutorials for cheating and cracking.
We explore this in detail through analysis of a subset of
the gaming cheating and hacking community, namely active
users on the MultiPlayer Game Hacking forum (MPGH),
using a subset of the CrimeBB dataset [15]. This publicly
accessible forum was chosen over others that are more general
in nature due to its gaming-specific focus, avoiding the need to
identify gaming-related discussions. Our research is intended
for informing better understanding of the dynamics of these
communities and the pathways taken by individuals within
them, rather than for the purposes of police investigation.
This work aims to classify key actors within the forum
community. Specifically, we:
• Create a systematic data processing framework, for anal-
ysis of large, unstructured forum datasets.
• Apply natural language processing (NLP) tools to auto-
matically classify post type.
• Cluster actors using k-means clustering, social network
analysis, and group-based trajectory modelling (which
models the trajectories of forum members over time).
Using these methods, we identify actors in clusters with
high concentrations of, or have multiple connections to,
key actors. We predict these are also key actors.
• Use predictive models, namely logistic regression, ran-
dom forest, and neural networks, to predict key actor
status.
• Use topic analysis to cross-validate predictions.
Combining features allows for multiple indicators including
interaction graphs and post contents to be modelled, to better
predict key actor status on the forum.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Pastrana et al. [2] analyse HackForums, a popular and long-
running underground forum, to predict key actors, who are
defined as forum users of interest to law enforcement. To
predict key actor status, they use logistic regression, social
network analysis, and clustering, and cross-validate predictions
using topic analysis.
Pastrana et al. [2] use latent Dirichelt allocation (LDA)
for creating the per-topic word lists used for validating key
actor predictions. However, Deliu et al. [16] find that LDA
cannot detect ‘zero days’, vulnerabilities in software which
the vendor is unaware of or has not been able to fix, due to
sparse word usage. Therefore, LDA may not be appropriate for
automatically detecting new or uncommon cybercrime-related
terms used by key actors. Macdonald et al. [17] use NLP tools
to determine the sentiment of key words used in posts, and find
that these are limited as sentiment analysis is not perfect for
modelling dialogue. They also find automated methods cannot
automatically identify new terms.
Caines et al. [18] developed NLP annotation tools for
HackForums data. These tools classify post according to: post
type (e.g. if the post is a request for information, a product or
service for sale, or an answer to someone’s technical query);
author intent (e.g. helpful, grateful, sarcastic, disapproving,
or abusive); and addressee (i.e. an individual, a number of
individuals, or other members of the forum as a whole).
Past research has used members’ reputation scores for
validating prediction results. Reputation scores are calculated
using a voting system, where a member who likes or dislikes a
member’s post can either upvote or downvote the post respec-
tively. High reputation scores may signal trustworthiness, and
therefore such metric is often used in validation. For example,
Marin et al. [7] identify key actors on a darkweb forum, and
use reputation scores to validate prediction results. Also, Ben-
jamin and Chen [19] highlight the significance of reputation
scores, and create a model to predict reputation scores using a
set of features including the number of replies created and
the average post length, in order to predict members who
have a high reputation, and could potentially be a key actor.
They find reputation is influenced by the content of posts,
and NLP annotation tools could help to better model post
content, instead of relying on the indirect reputation scoring
system. In addition, Zhang and Li [20] find reputation highly
correlates with post-centred characteristics, such as the number
of comments (replies) as user has made, or the average post
length.
Biswas et al. [21] do not use reputation at all in their work,
and instead finds member metrics (e.g. number of messages
posted, posts per thread, average word count) and NLP-derived
features (e.g. keyword similarity, sentiment) to be significant
predictors of key actor status.
Marin et al. [7] takes a different approach and combines pre-
dictors into a hybrid prediction model, for validating results.
This combines predictions with reputation scores to cross-
validate key actor predictions. Pastrana et al. [2] use a similar
approach, but use topic analysis for cross-validation.
Samtani and Chen [22] look at the interaction graph of the
network of members, finding that the network of key actors
is not connected, yet a high degree of connectedness exists
among key actors. This shows that while not all key actors
interact and influence each other, their strong connection to
other members could be influential. Sarvari et al. [23] find
similar results, with key actors having high centrality and
PageRank indices. However, Johnsen and Franke [24] find
centrality measures to be biased towards those who commu-
nicate more, rather than those who may be more influential. It
could be the case of a key actor predominantly communicating
outside of the public area of the forum, and centrality measures
may not reflect this.
Overdorf et al. [4] begins to try to detect such out-of-band
private messages based on interactions on the public forum,
but finds no straightforward relation between these. However,
when identifying important features they used, they found
NLP-derived features (e.g. bag of words used) to be more
important for predictions than metadata (e.g. time spent on
forum, reputation).
It is also interesting to begin to categorise key actors,
for identifying subgroups who may benefit from different
types of targeted intervention activities, and then to be able
to work out development of each subgroup for identifying
intervention points. Seebruck [25] categorises by aims, such
as for profit, revenge, or recreation. Whereas Zhang et al. [26]
categorises hackers by knowledge levels, such as guru, casual,
and learning. Frank et al. [27] uses the guru category of key
actors on one forum, to trace these across, finding a small
number move information across. Park et al. [6] use different
approach by looking to categorise post types by key actors
using social graphs. They identify roles of consumers and
talkers. They also find weighting by the amount users interact
on the forum is important.
III. METHODS
A. Dataset
We use a subset of the CrimeBB dataset [15], which
contains data scraped from 25 different underground forums,
and is available from the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre.1
Specifically, we use data from the MultiPlayer Game Hack-
ing (MPGH) forum, an underground discussion platform for
members to discuss hacking and cheating techniques for
online multiplayer games. As well as general discussions of
gaming and technology, the forum provides a marketplace for
trading goods and services, such as for cracked accounts, and
alternative currencies. Cracked accounts include those where
the credentials have been stolen, and are used for gaining free
access to paid services. Alternative currencies advertised for
transfer includes Bitcoin and gift vouchers such as Amazon
Gift Cards.
We selected MPGH for the gaming-specific nature of the
forum, to reduce complexity in analysis; other larger forums
such as HackForums would require either a manual or auto-
matic selection of gaming-related activity, which is non-trivial.
As MPGH is gaming-specific, analysis can be carried out with
the entire dataset.
The forum contains over 730 top-level subforums. These are
high-level collections, such as “General Hacking” and “Mar-
ketplace”. Contained within these are 764k threads, which
each contain a linear ordered set of posts focused around a
certain topic, such as the sale of an item on the marketplace.
There are over 9.4M posts on the forum made by over 478k
members. Of these, 18% have posted over 5 times. We refer to
these as “active” members, and only these members (n=84k)
are used for our subsequent analysis.
B. Ethical Considerations
Ethics approval was granted from the department’s ethics
committee. Furthermore, we complied with the Cambridge Cy-
bercrime Centre’s data sharing agreements. The research uses
data collected from a publicly available forum. It would not
be possible to gain informed consent from all members as this
would be considered as spamming. As this work only analyses
collective behaviour, rather than identifying individuals, under
the British Society of Criminologys Statement of Ethics [28],
this work falls outside the requirement of informed consent.
Further precautions taken include not identifying individuals
(including not publishing usernames), and presenting results
objectively.
C. Key Actor Selection
Due to a lack of information about law enforcement activity
on the forum, key actor selection was a manual process. We
selected 84 key actors from popular areas of the forum that
exhibited set criteria, such as sustained involvement in harmful
or illegal behaviour, that were likely to indicate that they
might benefit from diversionary approaches to prevent them
1https://www.cambridgecybercrime.uk/
from becoming involved in more serious illegal activities. Key
actors included:
• 20 members who had released tools and tutorials on
cracking and hacking subforums. This included key
generators used for stealing software, and tutorials for
credential stuffing tools used to break into accounts.
Credential stuffing is prominent on the forum, including
in the marketplace which sells cracked accounts, which
have likely been obtained through these techniques.
• 17 members who had released tools and tutorials on
gaming-specific forums, for bypassing anti-cheat mecha-
nisms.
• 4 members who had advertised booting services.
• 21 members who were found through compilation posts
on hacking tools, including tutorials and tools for UDP
flooding (used in denial of service attacks), key logging,
and various techniques for hacking websites.
• 25 members who had a high proportion of interactions
with other key actors and were also involved in similar
cybercrime-related activities. These members were man-
ually checked to validate these before being added to the
initial set of key actors.
The manual selection process began by identifying subfo-
rums likely to contain activity of interest to law enforcement.
We selected threads within these with high post counts and
positive replies, to avoid poor quality threads. The selection
method aimed to identify a broad range of key actors, although
we note they may not be representative of the whole population
of the forum.
D. Data Processing Pipeline
The data processing pipeline is shown in Figure 1. The
pipeline includes pre-processing and feature extraction, pre-
diction techniques, and validation.
1) Feature Extraction: Member features are extracted by
adapting open-source research tools developed by Pastrana et
al. [2]. Features include per-member features of activity on
the forum. The tools were developed for a different subset
of the CrimeBB dataset, allowing the tools to be adapted to
this dataset. While the tools were developed for a general
underground hacking forum, we adapt these for analysis of
MPGH. In particular, MPGH does not provide reputation
voting data, so such features are omitted.
NLP features are extracted using tools developed by Caines
et al. [18]. These tools provide per-post annotations from the
dataset. For each user, we count annotations to create per-
user features, except for sentiment and token count, for which
we take the mean value. The NLP tools were developed for
analysing a different subset of CrimeBB, and hence we adapt
these for use in MPGH. We note the tools use models trained
on HackForums data, where actors may use slightly different
terminology than on MPGH.
There are highly correlated features contained in the initial
featureset. As later analytic approaches assume a lack of mul-
ticollinearity, we iteratively remove features with correlation
of over 80%. Of the 47 features initially collected, 32 are
Fig. 1. Data processing pipeline
retained for analysis. The set of 32 per-member features,
containing members with over five posts, with an additional
feature indicating whether they are in the set of manually
identified key actors (“manual key actor annotations”), shall
be referred to as the dataset. The dataset contains a variety of
features related to metadata and post content, for predicting
and modelling actor activity, including:
• Social network analysis centrality measures. These are
used to quantify a members interactions with other forum
members, to model author-replier relationships between
members. This includes eigenvector centrality, a measure
of the influence of a node (forum member) in a network
(directed graph of repliers to post authors).
• The number of posts and threads made within categories
of subforum, namely hack, tech, coding, games, market,
and web. Also, the number of threads within common and
money categories are included, the number of posts in the
graphics category, and the combined sum of threads and
posts in currency exchange areas of the forum.
• Features of members, namely the number of days they
have spent on the forum in total, the number of days
between registering on the forum and their first post, and
reputation score of the user.
• Interactions on the forum, including the total number of
citations a user has made (quoted text in post replies).
• Impact metrics based on measures used in academia
for quantifying research quality using citations, namely
h-index and i-100 index. The h-index is defined by a
member having index h if they have created h threads
which have at least h replies. i-100 is defined as the
number of threads a member has created with at least
100 replies.
• NLP features include post sentiment, post activity type
(social post type only), post intent type, a feature indi-
cating if a post includes a code snippet, and the average
number of tokens (individual words) a user has for all of
their posts. Post sentiment is a score of emotion used in
each post. Post intent types include gratitude, moderate,
negative, positive, private message, and vouch (posts
showing support of or confidence for another member).
2) Prediction Techniques: We use a number of techniques
for prediction purposes. Logistic regression, neural networks,
and random forests are predictive models. We also use group-
based trajectory modelling and k-means clustering to identify
actors contained in clusters with a high proportion of key
actors. Social network analysis uses a graph of author-replier
relationships, to identify members which are connected to
three or more key actors (“bridge nodes”, defined by Pastrana
et al. [2]). Bridge nodes and those in key actor clusters are
also predicted to be key actors. The combination of prediction
techniques allows predictions to be made on different types
of member activity, including interactions with other mem-
bers (social network analysis), and posting activity over time
(group-based trajectory modelling), to build a stronger overall
classifier.
Social network analysis uses tools adapted from Pastrana
et al. [2] used for analysis of HackForums. This creates a
directed graph using nodes for members in the forum, and
edges representing replies: an edge from A to B represents a
reply from A to B, either by replying to a thread, or by citing a
post. This directed graph represents interactions on the forum.
For the visualisation, we only plot the key actors and their
closest neighbours, to make the graph easy to interpret. The
closest neighbours are defined as the highest weighted five
successors and five predecessors of a member, using the count
of interactions between members as the weighting of edges.
We use social network analysis to model interactions be-
tween members of the forum–the interactions between key
actors and non-key actors has the potential to influence non-
key actors to become interested in activities of key actors, and
progress further into more serious cybercrime. The aim of this
technique is to identify “bridge nodes”—nodes that connect
together three or more key actors.
k-means clustering was also used by Pastrana et al. [2] for
analysis of HackForums. This technique extracts clusters from
the set of features, to identify groups of members with similar
characteristics. The algorithm has one parameter, k, which is
the number of clusters to use. To determine the optimal value
of k, the Elbow method is used, which calculates a score to
represent the quality of clusters for each parameter value.
Group-based trajectory modelling is a statistical tech-
nique developed by Nagin [29] that takes time-series data and
groups these into different trends over time (“trajectories”).
Latent trajectory groups are allowed to emerge from the data
itself, rather than pre-specified, resulting in a series of trajecto-
ries, the group membership probabilities of each member, and
a group assignment based on their highest probability. This
technique was developed for use in criminology, and is now
being applied in other fields such as clinical research [30].
We use the post counts from the dataset over time, to iden-
tify trajectories of members within four subforums, namely
gaming, general, hacking, and market. The time series uses
quarter-by-quarter counts of posts for the first five years’ of
posting for each actor. Trajectories are found for low, medium,
and high activity levels in each subforum. For a member to
have a low activity level for a given category, they must have
posted between 20 and 99 times within the subforum. Users
with a medium activity level have between 100 and 499 posts,
and users with a high activity level for a category have posted
over 500 times within the given subforum. Those with fewer
than 20 posts are not included in the analysis.
This technique is useful as the dataset is intrinsically dy-
namic and the time-series approach of this method can better
model the development of users over time. We adapted our
STATA scripts,2 which use a plugin based upon work by Jones
and Nagin [31], for use on MPGH.
Logistic regression is used to predict future key actors.
This technique is useful for two purposes: first, we are able
to obtain a model used for prediction of potential key actors,
and secondly, we are able to inspect this type of model. For
example, odds values can show the impact each feature has
on the prediction outcome.
We use backwards stepwise logistic regression with the
likelihood ratio method. This method begins with all features
and iteratively removes those that do not have a significant
influence on the model. Field [32] justifies the use of stepwise
methods when causality is not of interest, but rather a model
to fit the data, and recommends the backward method over
the forward method, which has a higher risk of Type II (false
negative) errors. Cases that have an undue influence on the
2Available at https://github.com/JohnnyHistone/Group trajectory model
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model (where the Cooks distance is greater than 1.0) are
removed [32].
Neural networks are used to train from examples to find
patterns in the dataset, in order to predict future key actors.
We build a multi-layer perceptron classifier for our neural
network using the Keras [33] library, and wrap this inside a
scikit-learn [34] model for easier parameter tuning and model
inspection. Neural networks use hidden layers to train a non-
linear model, providing an advantage over logistic regression.
For this technique, the dataset is split into three sets: 64%
of members are used in the training set, 20% in the test set,
and 16% in the validation set. The training set is used to train
each model, and the test set is used to find suitable parameters.
The validation set is used to compare model performance, and
is not used during training or testing stages. Neural networks
require feature scaling to be performed on the dataset, and
therefore features are scaled down to the range between 0
and 1.
Comparing the low number of key actors with the size of the
training dataset, there is a large class imbalance. This could
result in models overfitting to the small set of positive samples,
or models predicting all cases as negative. To solve this
issue, we oversample the training dataset using SMOTE [35],
to have an equal number of positive and negative samples.
This technique creates synthetic cases based on the k nearest
neighbours of each selected case.
Neural networks typically have a number of hyperparame-
ters available for tuning the model, and therefore finding the
most suitable model can be computationally expensive. We
perform grid search with cross validation to select the best
hyperparameters and model, using F1 scoring with the test
dataset to select the best performing model. F1 score is the
harmonic mean of precision and recall, and is used due to the
imbalanced dataset.
It is not straightforward to inspect the reasoning of neural
network models, with tools limited due to the black-box nature
of the technique. Therefore, we use partial dependence plots
from the pdpbox library3 to inspect the neural network. These
plots are used to show the change in prediction (relative
changes of prediction probabilities) as the value for a given
feature increases.
Random forests consist of a number of decision trees.
Decision trees are used for supervised classification, and
recursively split a dataset into a tree structure. At each node in
the tree, a condition (e.g. h-index < 5) determines which
branch to take for predictions, and the weighting of positive-
negative examples at a leaf node determines the prediction
result. For a random forest, a weighting is used across all trees
to aggregate predictions from each tree, to create an overall
prediction value. To carry out prediction for a given tree, a
walk is used, starting at the root node and taking branches
depending the feature values, until ending up at a leaf node
containing the prediction result (majority label).
3https://github.com/SauceCat/PDPbox
However, decision trees are prone to overfitting if they
contain leaf nodes with a small number of examples, or
underfit if leaf nodes contain a large number of examples
with a half-half split of prediction classes. Typically pruning
is used to remove leaf nodes which may cause issues, but
this is not supported by the scikit-learn library [34]. To
overcome this issue, random forests are used, which apply
a random weighting across n decision trees. Note that scikit-
learn applies a random weighting across the trees, compared
to other implementations such as Breiman [36] where trees
each vote for a particular class.
Permutation importance is applied to the model, using the
eli5 library,4 to shuffle one feature at a time in order to
determine the weighting of each feature on the final result.
We also use the technique SHAP [37] to inspect the model.
SHAP values are useful for showing which features were more
influential for a single prediction outcome. When plotting
using the library, the figure shows increasing (pink) and
decreasing (blue) bars for a given prediction probability, with
wider bars having higher importance.
We again use the training-test split dataset, where the train-
ing dataset has been oversampled using SMOTE, to predict
future key actors. The model consists of a weighted set of
decision trees used to predict key actor status, using trees
containing simple conditions of features at each node.
Predictions for each technique are made using the following
criteria:
• Social network analysis: members connected to at least
3 key actors (“bridge nodes”).
• k-means clustering: members of the cluster with the
highest ratio of key actors.
• Group-based trajectory modelling: members of trajectory
archetypes with a high proportion of key actors.
• Logistic regression: members with a predicted probability
of 10% or more.
• Random forest and neural networks: members which are
predicted by the model to be key actors.
We combine these predictions, and use topic analysis to
validate results.
3) Validation Techniques: Predictions are used to identify
non-key actor members who have similar characteristics of
key actors. Predictions are then validated using topic analysis
to confirm if predicted key actors use similar cybercrime-
related terminology to those of key actors. We use topic
analysis for validation and not for prediction as this would be
computationally expensive to process for all forum content.
For topic analysis, we adapt code by Pastrana et al. [2],
which uses latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) to identify words
used by key actors for each category of subforums. From
this set, words relating to cybercrime activity are manually
selected.
To validate predictions, the same method is run for all posts
made by each predicted member, and to be confirmed, the
member must use at least 20% of the cybercrime-related terms
4http://github.com/TeamHG-Memex/eli5
which key actors use. This is used to check if predicted key
actors use similar cybercrime-related terms to those of key
actors.
IV. RESULTS
A. Social network analysis
Figure 2 shows the initial set of key actors are well
connected, except for three key actors. Note that while the
manual process of key actor selection identifies key actors
connected to other key actors (the yellow nodes), key actors
not selected using this process are connected by at most one
other node. This analysis identified 13 bridge nodes between
key actors, which are used for predicting future key actors.
B. k-means clustering
k-means found a cluster with a greater proportion of key
actors (8.3%, which includes 58.3% of all key actors) com-
pared to other clusters. Table I shows mean values of different
variable types for each cluster, including the interest categories
of each group, activity in currency exchange (#CurExc), and
social relation features (H = h-index, i100 = i-100 index, EV
= eigenvector centrality). This cluster has spent the second-
longest average time on the forum, have the greatest eigen-
vector value, and the highest average activity in currency
exchange. They are mostly interested in the gaming, common,
and marketplace subforums. The NLP features shows this
cluster has the lowest average sentiment score, while post-
related features are greater than other clusters. When clustering
only the set of key actors, all groups are primarily involved
with both common and gaming areas, with two groups also
interested in the marketplace.
C. Group-based trajectory modelling
There were fairly similar trajectories found in each of the
four subforums (gaming, general, hacking, and market). Over-
all, users tend to exhibit one of five key trajectory archetypes:
• Fickle, where members initially have high activity levels
that quickly decline.
• Decliner, where members’ activity levels decline steadily
to zero over time.
• Sustainer, where members’ activity levels are steady.
• Engager, where members’ activity levels steadily in-
crease, then decrease to zero after reaching a peak.
• Super-engager, where members’ activity levels increase
and then reduce to a lower, but sustained, level.
Group-based trajectory modelling shows that most key
actors are not very active in any of the trajectories within the
hacking area of the forum (see Table II). This is likely due
to the category not being the main focus of the forum, and
there are other underground forums which are more general
for these types of discussion.
Two trajectory archetypes were identified that contained a
high proportion of key actors. Of the 89 actors in the high-
frequency super-engager post activity in the gaming category
(the red line in Figure 3), 19 are key actors. Furthermore, of
the 55 actors in the high-frequency super-engager post activity
Fig. 2. Social network analysis graph of key actors and their closest neighbours (purple = general key actor, blue = key actor distributing tools and information,
yellow = key actor identified through interactions with other key actors, green = non key actor)
#KeyActors Activity Interests Social Relations NLP Features
/Count Days Threads/Posts cat1 cat2 cat3 #CurExc H i100 EV Sentiment SOC NEU POS NEG MOD PMS GRA VOU
49/589 1872.8 187.5/3418.8 G C M 4.5 21.8 2.3 0.03 0.051 754.6 5039.3 507.4 26.6 65.9 34.1 255.5 44.9
11/21275 826.6 8.8/68.6 G M C 0.4 2.8 0.0 0.00 0.067 14.9 110.4 10.6 0.5 1.1 2.9 9.7 2.7
20/55180 142.5 4.6/26.2 G M C 0.1 2.0 0.0 0.00 0.056 5.8 43.0 4.2 0.2 0.5 1.5 3.6 0.8
4/6898 1920.4 13.0/115.1 G M C 0.3 3.5 0.1 0.00 0.064 24.6 178.0 17.3 0.9 1.9 4.3 15.2 4.1
TABLE I
CHARACTERISTICS OF ACTIVE FORUM MEMBER GROUPS FROM K-MEANS CLUSTERING (K = 4). G=GAMING, C=COMMON, M=MARKETPLACE.
SOC=SOCIAL POST TYPE, NEU=NEUTRAL INTENT, POS=POSITIVE INTENT, NEG=NEGATIVE INTENT, MOD=MODERATE INTENT, PMS=PRIVATE
MESSAGE INTENT, GRA=GRATITUDE INTENT, VOU=VOUCH INTENT
in the general category (the red line in Figure 4), there are 17
key actors.
D. Logistic regression
Without any independent features in the model, 100% of
cases are predicted to not be key actors. Compared to the
baseline, the final model is significantly improved and is statis-
tically better at predicting key actors (χ2(15, n=83,942)=579.1,
p<.001). The final model accounts for between 0.7 and 43.8%
of the variance, accurately predicting 31.0% of key actors with
a low false error rate (0.01%).
Table III presents the results of the final step of the logistic
regression analysis. The odds ratios indicate that for each
increase in an actor’s h-index, the odds of them being a key
ator increases by 1.231. The frequency with which actors
posted on various sections also predicts being a key actor, with
each additional post in coding, gaming, market, tech and web
subforums increasing the odds by 1.002, 1.001, 1.002, 1.005,
and 1.113 respectively. Each additional thread generated in the
common and hacking subforums increased the odds of being
a key actor by 1.009 and 1.077 respectively.
Generating threads in the gaming section and posting in
currency exchange decreases the odds that users are key actors
by .991 and .954 respectively. Other features that decrease the
odds of being a key actor include showing gratitude (.997),
moderating posts (.980), social posts (.998), and having a high
i-100 index (.867).
Category Activity Level Fickle Decliner Sustainer Engager Super-engager
Gaming Low 4 (10734) 4 (12081) 1 (3155) 1 (5219) -
Mid - 3 (2862) 8 (2791) - -
High 2 (416) - 23 (409) 7 (527) 19 (89)
General Low 4 (1904) - 2 (471) 4 (1217) -
Mid 0 (356) 3 (461) - 0 (101) 8 (283)
High 3 (108) 6 (197) 17 (181) - 17 (55)
Hacking Low 3 (314) 9 (364) 7 (100) 19 (261) -
Mid - 0 (36) 4 (27) 3 (53) -
High - - - - -
Market Low 2 (6160) 14 (4380) 24 (1826) - -
Mid 1 (925) - 14 (519) 5 (956) -
High - 4 (59) 5 (114) 2 (120) -
TABLE II
NUMBER OF KEY ACTORS (ALL USERS IN PARENTHESES) FOR EACH
TRAJECTORY ARCHETYPE PER CATEGORY AND ACTIVITY LEVEL














Fig. 3. Group-based trajectories for high-frequency activity in the gaming
category
E. Random forest and neural network models
The random forest and neural network models predict 128
and 375 actors to be key actors, respectively. Random forest
and neural network models are black-boxes, and therefore
hard to inspect. We use techniques to assist our understanding
of the models, including using SHAP diagrams [37], which

















Fig. 4. Group-based trajectories for high-frequency activity in the general
category
TABLE III
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING KEY ACTORS
95% C.I. for Exp(B)
B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper
Step 17 intent gratitude -.003 .001 3.858 .050 .997 .994 1.000
intent moderate -.021 .006 11.626 .001 .980 .968 .991
postType social -.002 .001 9.451 .002 .998 .997 .999
CurrencyExchange -.047 .020 5.725 .017 .954 .918 .992
Reputation .000 .000 9.517 .002 1.000 1.000 1.000
h-index .208 .024 73.487 .000 1.231 1.174 1.291
i-100 -.143 .044 10.762 .001 .867 .796 .944
post coding .002 .000 29.671 .000 1.002 1.001 1.003
post gaming .001 .000 33.964 .000 1.001 1.001 1.001
post market .002 .000 17.680 .000 1.002 1.001 1.003
post tech .005 .002 3.907 .048 1.005 1.000 1.010
post web .107 .054 3.847 .050 1.113 1.000 1.238
thread common .009 .002 16.421 .000 1.009 1.005 1.013
thread gaming -.009 .005 4.042 .044 .991 .982 1.000
thread hack .074 .016 20.541 .000 1.077 1.043 1.112
Constant -8.435 .205 1685.465 .000 .000
Feature Weight Standard Deviation
1 Posts in the coding category 0.175807 0.026433
2 Threads in the common category 0.171898 0.090516
3 Posts containing code 0.091195 0.018782
4 Posts in the tech category 0.055403 0.013412





28 Total cites -0.031643 0.018201
29 Posts with gratitude intent -0.034834 0.022421
30 H-index -0.049396 0.008518
31 Threads in the coding category -0.052596 0.002372
32 Threads in the hack category -0.099399 0.011469
TABLE IV
PERMUTATION IMPORTANCE FOR RANDOM FOREST
identify important features for a given prediction result, and
partial dependence plots are used to visualise how changing
one feature value changes the prediction output.
Also, we use permutation importance from the eli5 library5
with the random forest model. This technique measures the
increase in prediction errors when a given feature is shuffled,
to determine the influence a feature has over the prediction
outcome. Permutation importance is applied to the random
forest model (Table IV). These results show posts either
containing code or in the coding category, and threads in the
common category, have a positive weighting on the prediction
in the model. Also, this found h-index to have a low weighting.
Partial dependency plots are used to inspect the neural
network model (Figure 5 and 6). Plots show percentiles for
each feature, to show the variation in prediction status as
the feature value increases. The partial dependence plot for
reputation shows a steady increase in change of prediction
value, with a larger increase between scores of 100 to 1000,
whereas h-index does not show any overall change, although
the standard deviation begins to rapidly increase when the h-
index is greater than 5.
SHAP is also useful to identify important features in a single
prediction instance, which can be compared to domain knowl-
edge to validate the model is working as expected. Figure
7 shows increasing (pink) and decreasing (blue) bars for a
given prediction probability, with wider bars having higher
importance. This shows the features relating to a member’s
reputation score and total number of citations have the greatest
5http://github.com/TeamHG-Memex/eli5



















Fig. 5. Partial dependency plot of reputation





















Fig. 6. Partial dependency plot of h-index
positive influence on the prediction value, and the number of
threads the member has made in the gaming category has the
greatest negative influence.
Figures 8 and 9 show the distribution of two features
(namely, h-index and reputation) for each set of predictions.
These were selected to illustrate the differing distributions of
each prediction technique. Overall, we note the distributions
of predicted key actor features differ greatly for different
techniques – for example, the neural network predicts a set
of members with a lower distribution of h-indices than other
prediction methods used. For reputation, the tail of each curve
differs, highlighting the different range of members selected.
F. Validation
Predictions were made using the criteria discussed previ-
ously for social network analysis (n=13), k-means clustering
(n=468), group-based trajectory modelling (n=99), logistic
regression (n=53), random forest (n=128) and neural networks
(n=377). Predictions are combined and validated using topic
analysis.
Topic analysis is first carried out on the initial set of key
actors. Figure 10 displays the various terms used by key
actors across each category. Terms are selected relating to the
creation or distribution of tools and tutorials, and these are
compared against the set of predicted key actors. Predicted
key actor results are considered validated if they use at least
20% of the selected terms used by key actors.
Of the 63 predictions of key actors where 3 or more
techniques overlap, 49 are validated using topic analysis
(Table V). Predictions from clustering are contained within
all of the overlaps, likely caused by the greater number of
predictions made by this technique. Predictions from logistic
regression, random forest, neural network, and group-based
trajectory modelling techniques occur in most overlaps. Social
network analysis only predicts a small number of potential
key actors. The threshold of overlaps could be increased to
four techniques per overlap, which would be necessary if a
greater number of validated key actors had been predicted at
this stage. Increasing the overlap to four would predict 29 key
actors, with 24 validated by topic analysis.
V. DISCUSSION
The combination of prediction techniques helps to identify
groups of predicted key actors. Results identify 7 overlaps
with predictions from social network analysis, showing that
bridge nodes are useful in identifying potential key actors.
This suggests, as indicated by other research [2], [22], [23],
that key actors in these communities may play a “mediating
role”, brokering connections between larger social groupings
in these communities. Diversionary interventions targeted at
these actors may, therefore, have a wider effect on the com-
munity as a whole.
Clustering identifies groups of similar characteristics, and
the cluster used for prediction shows that predicted key actors
are interested in gaming, common, and market type areas of
the forum. Also, these results highlight that predicted key
actors have on average a greater h-index compared to other
cluster groups. This suggests that they are important parts of
these communities’ social structures, with connections to a
wide range of other individuals on the forum.
Odds ratios found from logistic regression find an increase
of h-index to increase the predicted key actors status by 1.231.
Also, these show that new threads in common and hacking
subforums increases the odds of being a key actor. However,
new threads in the gaming section and posts in the currency
exchange section decrease the odds of being a key actor.
Plots showing the distribution of features for random forest
and neural network predictions highlight the importance of
using a combination of approaches. The distribution of repu-
tation is similar for both models, but the distribution of h-index
shows the different means of the set predicted by these models.
Group-based trajectory modelling finds a high proportion
of key actors with “super-engager” involvement trajectories,
with high-frequency post activity for the gaming and general
categories. This suggests that key actors have a characteristic
trajectory of initiation on this forum, and that posting in social
areas (as well as in areas more directly linked to hacking or
Fig. 7. SHAP values used to show feature importance for a potential key actor
SNA Clustering Logistic regression Random forest Neural network GBTM Predicted/Total Avg. Distance Farthest Closest
X X X 5/6 0.5 0.34 0.61
X X X 4/4 0.64 0.54 0.71
X X X 1/1 0.64 0.64 0.64
X X X 4/4 0.66 0.5 0.82
X X X 3/6 0.56 0.32 0.75
X X X 3/3 0.42 0.29 0.57
X X X 5/10 0.56 0.39 0.68
X X X X 1/1 0.43 0.43 0.43
X X X X 1/1 0.54 0.54 0.54
X X X X 1/1 0.37 0.37 0.37
X X X X 3/3 0.57 0.39 0.75
X X X X 3/5 0.52 0.39 0.63
X X X X 1/1 0.64 0.64 0.64
X X X X 4/6 0.51 0.29 0.68
X X X X X 2/2 0.57 0.54 0.61
X X X X X 7/8 0.64 0.45 0.75
X X X X X X 1/1 0.68 0.68 0.68
11 49 24 32 28 38 49/63
TABLE V
RESULTS OF TOPIC ANALYSIS ON PREDICTIONS, WITH INTERSECTIONS OF AT LEAST THREE METHODS. SUM OF PREDICTIONS, VALIDATED BY TOPIC
ANALYSIS, ARE BELOW EACH TECHNIQUE.



















Fig. 8. Distribution of h-indices for each prediction group of actors
illegal activities) is important to their involvement in these
communities.
The combination of individual techniques is important, with
both the combination of features to model different features
available (such as post content, user activity, and interactions),
and with different techniques including feature importance to
signify important features in predicting. Also, analysis shows
that a combination of features can provide improved prediction
over a single features (such as reputation), where this can
contain bias.
It is also useful to use SHAP diagrams for inspecting




















Fig. 9. Distribution of reputation scores for each prediction group of key
actors
the model and identifying predictive features, as these show
why models made certain predictions, and could be used for
identifying certain intervention points.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Despite containing over 9.4 million posts, MPGH has a
smaller collection of users than some of the other forums in
CrimeBB. We note, however, that our analysis is exploratory,
to be later used for finding useful intervention techniques.
Key actors were initially selected using a manual process,
due to a lack of existing public information relating to law
html (84), thanks (83), game (83), one (83), mpgh (83), time (83), work
(82), help (81), code (80), name (80), post (80), thing (80), way (80),
thank (79), people (79), got (79), c (79), lol (79), computer (78), version
(78), thread (78), account (78), virus (78), man (78), hack (77), day (77),
copy (77), program (76), ip (76), section (75), scan (75), information
(75), pm (74), money (73), method (73), key (73), part (73), player (73),
end (73), ban (72), image (72), pc (72), password (71), case (71), cheat
(70), source (70), year (70), info (69), function (69), mod (68), address
(68), service (68), haha (68), class (68), keyboard (67), music (67), build
(67), order (67), window (66), browser (66), laptop (65), news (65), card
(65), injector (65), weapon (65), contact (65), bump (64), aimbot (64),
block (63), paypal (63), skype (63), mouse (63), hacker (63), price (62),
skill (61), range (61), flash (60), gun (60), cpu (60), troll (59), gain (59),
ram (58), graphic (54), performance (54), market (53), nexon (52), board
(51), string (51), trading (50), refund (48), giveaway (48), cooler (46), nx
(41), budget (39), predator (38), currency (38), symmetrical (37), bitcoin
(34), coin (31), xml (30), integer (27), btc (27), dim (26), eth (24), crypto
(20), byval (15), congratulation (15), c++ (12), bch (7), tether (5), usdt
(2)
Fig. 10. Combined list of terms used within topics (bold terms relate to the
creation or distribution of tools and tutorials, and the count of key actors using
these follows each term)
enforcement activity on the forum. The manual process set out
criteria for selection, and involved different areas of interest
within the forum, to select a good sample of key actors.
However, the selection process could benefit further from both
prior knowledge of law enforcement activity, and automated
annotation techniques, to build a gold-standard training dataset
for analysis.
We used analysis tools by Pastrana et al. [2], created
for analysis of a general underground forum, as we found
discussion topics on the forums use a similar lexicon, and
therefore the tools are able to generalise over different types
of underground forums. However, different terms may be used
by key actors on different forums, requiring manual human
verification. Future work may build on this to automatically
classify common and new terms, to detect those which may
be used for predicting future key actors, with advanced NLP
tools.
Most techniques used looked at the dataset as a cross-
section, except for the time-series approach with group-based
trajectory modelling. It would be interesting to adapt existing
methods to time-series approaches, to assist with research into
cybercrime pathways. This may include adapting the topic
analysis tools to include language evolution over time.
Also, further analysis into subgroups of key actors may be of
interest, through further clustering techniques, including topic
analysis within clusters, or time-series clustering approaches
including k-means of longitudinal data.
VII. CONCLUSION
We took a multi-technique approach to predict key actors,
members who are participating in sustained involvement of
harmful or illegal behaviour, that were likely to indicate
that they might benefit from diversionary approaches. This
prediction approach was used to identify potential key actors,
and to characterise their involvement in the community on
this underground forum through a range of measures. This
research both develops a more generally-applicable prediction
mechanism for identifying and characterising key actors in un-
derground forums, and elucidates a range of potential insights
into the roles played by these actors in these communities and
their pathways of initiation.
We proposed a systematic framework for analysing forum
datasets. These require big data approaches for analysis, due
to the scale and unstructured nature of the data. This could
constitute the foundation of a more general approach to the
study of underground forum communities, and research on
hard-to-use scraped forum data.
We applied the framework for analysis of a dataset consist-
ing of posts and threads from the forum MultiPlayer Game
Hacking, selected for the forum’s focus on both gaming and
hacking. 49 predictions of potential key actors were found,
by combining predictions from intersections of at least three
different types of analysis techniques, validated using topic
analysis.
Analysis included three types of clustering techniques,
namely k-means clustering, social network analysis, and
group-based trajectory modelling. In addition to the predic-
tions from these, three predictive models were also used,
namely logistic regression, random forest, and neural net-
works. However, our analysis may be limited by the initial set
of key actors, and future work should improve on this area.
Use of topic analysis for checking prediction results, and
overlaps of prediction sets, assisted in validating predictions.
NLP features used did not have a large positive or negative
influence for many of the models, due to high correlation with
other features, and similar values across different users. Group-
based trajectory models identified two trajectories which con-
tained a high proportion of key actors. Future work in this
area could model development of cross-forum pathways over
time, by developing time-series analysis tools, including the
use of other time-series based machine learning techniques.
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